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Glossary of Abbreviations  
A5 Article 5 (of the Anti-Personnel Mine Bane Convention) 
ADP Accelerated Demining Programme 
APMBC Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention  
AP Anti-personnel 
CCM Convention on Cluster Munitions  
CHA Confirmed Hazardous Area 
CND Comissao Nacional de Desminagem 
 National Demining Commission 
ERW Explosive Remnants of War 
FADM   Mozambican Armed Defence Force 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards 
IND Instituto Nacional de Desminagem 
 National Demining Institute 
MAE Ministry of State Administration 
MoD Ministry of Defence  
MoI Ministry of Interior 
MRE Mine Risk Education 
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
ONUMOZ UN Operation in Mozambique 
PDC Provincial demining Commission 
QA Quality Assurance 
QC Quality Control 
QM Quality Management  
SHA Suspected Hazardous Area 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme  
UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
 
 
  
 2 | 35 
 
Executive Summary  
Introduction  
Mozambique is committed to having completed implementation of its mine clearance obligations 
under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) by 1 January 2015. This 
will, for the most part, mark the end of proactive demining efforts in Mozambique. It is 
understood that it is always possible that previously unknown mined areas may be discovered 
after completion has been declared.  
 
With a view to being able to manage residual contamination once completion of international 
treaty obligations has been declared and pro-active humanitarian demining efforts have ended, 
Mozambique’s National Demining Institute (IND) requested that the GICHD to conduct an 
assessment, looking at Mozambique’s national capacity to manage residual contamination.  
 
The purpose of the assessment is to conduct a capacity assessment and mapping of the IND 
and other relevant government institutions, and to present recommendations concerning the 
transition of the IND and the establishment of a sustainable national capacity to manage and 
respond to residual contamination.  
 
The assessment team consisted of two GICHD advisors from the operations consulting division 
and one Mozambican consultant. The team met with national and international stakeholders in 
Maputo and in the two Northern Provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa.   
 
What is residual contamination? 
Residual contamination amounts to the sites or areas where mines and other explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) are discovered after all suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and 
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) have been processed and considered fit for normal human 
use (at least with respect to the surface and immediate subsurface of these areas). 
 
Residual contamination does not amount to locations or areas which, on the basis of evidence 
gathered through non-technical and/or technical survey and the analysis of any existing data 
relevant to the associated site/area, are known by national authorities to be either SHAs or 
CHAs. 
 
Residual contamination in Mozambique 
 
As of June 2014, the IND has declared a total of six out of 10 provinces to be mine-free: 
 Cabo Delgado (2012) 
 Niassa (2012) 
 Nampula (2011) 
 Zambezia (2010) 
 Gaza (2012) 
 Maputo (2014) 
 
Completion of implementation of Article 5 by Mozambique will mark the end of pro-active 
humanitarian demining efforts in Mozambique. As residual contamination is likely for any State 
whose territory has been subject to the use of mines/explosive remnants of war (ERW), 
Mozambique will need capacities to manage residual contamination as and when it is 
discovered.  The transition from a pro-active phase of humanitarian demining to a reactive phase 
should ideally be accompanied by a restructuring and shift of the IND from the MoFA to a more 
appropriate institutional home, given the expected problems and challenges at hand. 
 
Findings and Recommendations  
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What is residual contamination? 
Acknowledging the APMBC’s definition of a ‘mined area’ and IMAS’ definition of ‘residual risk’, it 
is logical to define residual contamination as the sites or areas where mines and other ERW are 
discovered after all confirmed or suspected hazardous areas have been processed and 
considered fit for normal human use (at least with respect to the surface and immediate 
subsurface of these areas).  
Residual contamination does not amount to locations or areas which, on the basis of evidence 
gathered through non-technical and/or technical survey and the analysis of any existing data 
relevant to the associated site/area, are known by national authorities to be either confirmed or 
suspected hazardous areas. 
Recommendations:  
 Develop a plan, detailing how areas that are currently categorised as ‘residual minefields’ 
will be analysed. 
 
 Re-examine the information that led to areas being entered into the IMSMA database as 
‘residual minefields.’ Carry out a desk assessment and revisit these areas to conduct 
non-technical surveys to determine if there is any existing basis of evidence for them to 
be considered suspected hazardous areas and if any can be cancelled. Regarding 
recording areas as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), it is important to underline that 
the IMAS notes, “inaccessible areas, or areas with limited information available, should 
not by default be recorded as SHA. SHAs should only be recorded in a database when 
there is sufficient evidence to justify doing so.”1 
 
 Re-classify remaining areas that are currently categorised as ‘residual minefields’ in 
IMSMA, reflecting the findings of the above survey activities and analysis and develop a 
technical survey and clearance plan to address the remaining suspected and/or 
confirmed hazardous areas accordingly.  
 
 Ensure IMSMA does not contain any areas categorised as ‘residual minefields’ while 
proactive demining is still ongoing and until areas that are truly residual (previously 
unknown) are discovered after all SHAs and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) have 
been processed and considered fit for normal human use.  
 
Extent and nature of the residual contamination problem  
A clear understanding of the problem at hand is a precondition for predicting what the future 
challenges are likely to be, and what national capacities will be needed to address them.  
 
Assuming that the situation in the mine-free Northern provinces is indicative of what can be 
expected in the rest of the country, one can predict that the residual contamination problem will 
be limited, mainly consisting of UXO.  
 
Recommendations:  
 Develop sustainable national capacities that are appropriate to the Mozambican context.   
 
                                               
 
1
 IMAS 07.11, Land Release,  March 2013, http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imas-
international-standards/english/series-07/IMAS-07.11-Ed.1-Am2.pdf  
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 Develop and sustain national EOD capacity within police. Given the identified strengths 
and opportunities, the police is the most suitable actor to be responsible for addressing 
residual UXO/ERW contamination (spot tasks).  
 
 Allocate residual demining tasks to the FADM (area tasks).  
 
Post-completion context and needs for a regulatory institute   
The IND was established in 1999, mandated to carry out specific tasks, reflecting the problems 
at the time. The transition from decades of proactive survey and mine clearance (by international 
operators) to predominantly reactive responses to reported threats (to be dealt with by national 
actors) will result in a new context with different problems and distinct needs. 
 
Recommendations:  
 
 Analyse future anticipated problem and develop national capacities accordingly.  
 
 Develop a future regulatory structure and capacities based on actual needs;  
ensure it is appropriate and sustainable.  
 
 Secure a future regulatory institutional home within the MAE.   
 
 Modify/renew the mandate as appropriate (name change).  
 
 
National stakeholders, national ownership and sustainability 
The transition from a proactive mine action programme to a reactive context is expected to be 
accompanied by a shift to greater national ownership, including regarding managing the problem 
and funding the activities. National commitment will be essential to ensure necessary resources 
are made available.   
 
Recommendation:  
 Secure commitment to addressing residual contamination at the highest level of relevant 
actors (MAE, MoI, MoD), through effective and regular coordination and information 
sharing.  
 
 Secure financial commitment for the costs associated with managing residual 
contamination. 
 
Roles and responsibilities 
Mozambique’s transition to a residual contamination context will require a careful examination of 
the various stakeholders involved, and an agreement on their respective roles and 
responsibilities. Transparency and clarity will be essential to ensure effective and efficient 
management of residual contamination, including coordination and information management.  
The involvement of the Provincial Demining Commissions is likely to be greater in the future, 
given the expected increased involvement of provincial government structures. It appears, 
however, that the PDCs’ capacities and resources are at times limited and that their roles and 
responsibilities would benefit from being clarified.  
 
 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 Develop a national policy and/or SOPs on the management of residual contamination, 
defining key actors’ roles and responsibilities, including stipulating resource allocation 
and division of labour.  
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 Ensure reporting structures are transparent and known to everyone.  
 
 Review and clarify the mandate, roles and responsibilities of the PDCs.  
 
 
Information management: a precondition for effective coordination  
Information management, including the management of the national IMSMA data base, is one of 
IND’s key responsibilities. It will be crucial to ensure that relevant information is accurate, 
accessible, available and up-to-date in a residual contamination context.  
 
Recommendation:  
 Ensure effective information management. Information related to future accidents and 
activities should be collected, stored, analysed, updated and shared, to facilitate the 
effective and efficient management of residual contamination.   
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Introduction 
Background to the assessment 
Mozambique is committed to having completed implementation of its mine clearance obligations 
under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) by 1 January 2015. This 
will, for the most part, mark the end of proactive demining efforts in Mozambique.2 It is 
understood that it is always possible that previously unknown mined areas may be discovered 
after completion has been declared.  
 
With a view to being able to manage residual contamination once completion of international 
treaty obligations has been declared and pro-active humanitarian demining efforts have ended, 
Mozambique’s National Demining Institute (IND) requested the GICHD to conduct an 
assessment, looking at Mozambique’s national capacity to manage residual contamination.  
The purpose of the assessment was to conduct a capacity assessment and mapping of the IND 
and other relevant government institutions, and to present recommendations concerning the 
transition of the IND and the establishment of a sustainable national capacity to manage and 
respond to residual contamination.  
The assessment team consisted of two GICHD advisors from the operations consulting division 
and one Mozambican consultant. The assessment team met with national and international 
stakeholders in Maputo and in the two Northern Provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa.   
The assessment team conducted a debriefing with IND, presenting preliminary findings and 
recommendations at the end of the assessment mission.  
  
                                               
 
2
 Mozambique also has reported that it has clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
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Current structure and status of the mine action 
programme   
International operators  
A total of four international humanitarian mine action organisations currently operate in 
Mozambique:  
 APOPO;  
 Handicap International (HI);  
 HALO Trust; and  
 NPA.  
Commercial companies 
A total of 52 commercial clearance companies, including two international (Bactec and 
MECHEM), are currently registered in Mozambique. 
Several informants expressed concern regarding the professionalism and quality of many of the 
national commercial companies.  
Mining and infrastructure companies commonly contract commercial clearance companies to 
carry out verification before commencing work, something that is recommended by the IND.  It 
appears, however, that there are no formal protocols regulating this. The IND accredits all 
commercial companies before they start operating. Due to a lack of resources, however, the IND 
noted that accreditation procedures are not as thorough as they could be.  
Mozambican Armed Defence Force (FADM) 
Over the period 2002 – 2013, the FADM implemented clearance activities in the provinces of 
Niassa, Nampula, Sofala, Gaza and Maputo.3 The assessment team was not in a position to 
obtain more detailed information concerning FADM’s clearance activities and results; IND’s 
information management unit informed that the national IMSMA data base does not include 
FADM and police clearance statistics. 
Several operators expressed concern regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of FADM’s 
clearance operations, noting a lack of motivation and professionalism as key impediments to 
effective and efficient operations.   
Provincial Demining Commissions  
With the view to enhance mine action coordination at the provincial and local levels, IND created 
Provincial Demining Commissions (PDCs) in 2010 in the Provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa 
and Zambezia. In the following years, IND continued to form PDCs and by 2014, PDCs were 
created in nine out of ten provinces. The PDCs comprise representatives from the local 
government, including the Provincial Governor’s Office, the Directorate of Planning and Finance, 
                                               
 
3
 Mozambique’s 2013 APMBC A5 Extension Request, ibid 
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the Provincial Police Command, the army, the police, health services and the civil society.4 
Additional stakeholders are in some cases represented, depending on the province.5  
The PDCs have the following key responsibilities:6 
1. Liaise with the IND in the process of planning, coordination and monitoring of demining 
activities at the provincial level. 
2. Propose annual demining priorities to their respective provincial governments, defined in 
coordination with IND. 
3. Report periodically to the provincial governments, with a view to solving the problem of 
land mines and UXO. 
4. Participate in national workshops on clearance on behalf of the respective provincial 
governments.  
5. Coordinate the activities undertaken by community civic education agents in preventing 
mine/UXO accidents, and collecting information on suspected mined areas.  
6. Work with health and social sectors in relation to assistance and socio-economic 
reintegration of persons with disabilities, following mine/UXO accidents. 
7. Participate in IND evaluations of demining activities at the provincial level, as part of the 
validation of the results at the end of clearance operations.  
Following the successful identification and clearance of all anti-personnel (AP) mines, IND 
declared Maputo Province “mine-free” in March 2014. The Provincial Permanent Secretary of 
the Maputo PDC noted three key tasks of the PDC: 
 raise awareness of mines/ERW in communities;  
 mobilise communities; and  
 report hazardous items. 
When the public discovers a hazardous object, the Permanent Secretary informed that the 
information is generally shared with community leaders, who report to the administrative/local 
authority, who in turn informs the district level, who then reports to the defence and security 
forces (police and FADM). The Permanent Secretary noted that, while this process is not 
formally documented, it is “generally known / well established.”7 
One landmine accident took place in Maputo Province after it was declared “mine-free” in March 
2014, resulting in the death of a cow. HALO Trust informed the assessment team that it was 
contacted by IND, who requested it to visit the site where the accident took place and to carry 
out an investigation.  
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
UNDP has provided technical assistance to the Mozambique mine action programme since 
1999. The structure and position of the UNDP international chief technical advisor (CTA) was, 
from 2008 to 2011, supported under the project “Weapons Risk Mitigation and Mainstreaming 
Mine Action, Small Arms and Light Weapons Controls 2008–2011”. The CTA position is 
currently supported by the “Support to the National Demining Programme 2012–2015.” As part 
                                               
 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 For instance, the tourism industry is represented in the Inhambane commission and representatives from the 
mineral resources sector are represented in the Tete commission.  
6
 ToR, Provincial Demining Commissions, IND and MoFA, 2008, unofficially translated version 
7
 Meeting with Maputo Provincial Demining Commission Permanent Secretary, 16 June 2014  
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of its disaster relief and risk reduction efforts, the UN Development Assistance Framework for 
Mozambique (UNDAF) 2012–2015 lists supporting Mozambique to meet its obligations under 
Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.8 
Towards Completion 
Mozambique used to be one of the most heavily landmine affected countries in the world. The 
country’s progress in identifying and clearing landmines is considered a great success. The 
significant contribution of several international operators, in combination with a strengthened 
IND, resulted in a mine action programme that deserves to be commended for its achievements.   
International treaty obligations   
The APMBC entered into force for Mozambique on 1 March 1999. In its initial transparency 
report, Mozambique declared that it had obligations to demine under Article 5 of the Convention. 
In 2008, Mozambique, believing that it was not possible to comply with its obligations by its 1 
March 2009 deadline, requested and received an extended deadline to 1 March 2014. 9  In 2013, 
realising it would not be possible to meet the 1 March 2014 deadline, Mozambique requested 
and was granted a second extended deadline until 31 December 2014. At the Convention’s June 
2014 Third Review Conference, Mozambique indicated that it was on track to complete 
implementation by this second extended deadline.  
The practical answer to what completion of the implementation of Article 5 of the Convention 
means can be found in the definition of a ‘mined area’ in Article 2 of the Convention as ‘an area 
which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.’10 Hence, ‘the 
implementation of Article 5 requires that States Parties render all such areas no longer 
dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines.’11 A State Party 
that has reported one or more areas that fit the definition of ‘an area which is dangerous due to 
the presence or suspected presence of mines’ will know that it has completed implementation 
when it no longer has any areas under its jurisdiction or control that is ‘dangerous due to the 
presence of suspected presence of mines.’12 As of September 2014, 28 States Parties (out of 
59, for which this obligation has been relevant) had reported completion. 
In 2006, the States Parties to the APMBC adopted a voluntary declaration of completion of A5 
obligations. The purpose of the declaration is to ensure consistency among States Parties in 
reporting completion and to ensure that it is grounded in the Convention’s legal text. ‘…the 
declaration of completion sees that a State Party declares that it has done exactly what the State 
Party has committed itself to doing in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1. Ambiguous 
language and terminology, such as ‘mine-free’ or ‘impact-free’ is absent from this declaration.’ 13 
                                               
 
8
 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3690  
9
 Mozambique : Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 2008, 
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-
areas/art5_extensions/countries/Mozambique-ExtRequest-Received-6May2008.pdf  
10
 APMBC, http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/text_status/Ottawa_Convention_English.pdf  
11
 ISU, Understanding Mine Clearance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention, 2011, 
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/publications-about-the-convention/mine-clearance/  
12
 Ibid.  
13
 Ibid.  
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The adoption of the declaration of completion was the first formal acknowledgment by States 
Parties that, following completion, residual contamination may be a reality. The declaration 
allows for the possibility for States Parties to express that there remains a risk that previously 
unknown mined areas may be discovered, after the declaration of completion. The declaration 
further lists the practical steps that a State Party would take in accordance with the Convention, 
if it discovers previously unknown mined areas:  
[State] declares that it has destroyed [ensured the destruction of] all anti-personnel 
mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were 
known or suspected to be emplaced, in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention. 
 
[State] declares that it completed this obligation on [date]. 
In the event that previously unknown mined areas are discovered after this date, 
[State] will: 
 
(i) report such mined areas in accordance with its obligations under Article 7 and share such 
information through any other informal means such as the Intersessional Work Programme, 
including the Standing Committee meetings; 
(ii) ensure the effective exclusion of civilians in accordance with Article 5; and 
(iii) destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in these mined areas as a 
matter of urgent priority, making its needs for assistance known to other States Parties, as 
appropriate.14 
 
It should be noted that Mozambique is also a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(CCM), a convention that entered into force on 1 September 2011. Mozambique has reported 
that it has an obligation ‘to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster 
munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or 
control’, in accordance with Article 4 of the CCM.15 Mozambique anticipates having completed 
implementation of this obligation ‘no later than 2016.’16  
 
What is residual contamination?   
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) define, in the context of humanitarian demining, 
residual risk as ‘the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove 
and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.’17  
 
Building upon this, it is logical to define residual contamination as the sites or areas where mines 
and other ERW are discovered after all SHAs and CHAs have been processed and considered 
fit for normal human use (at least with respect to the surface and immediate subsurface of these 
areas). Residual contamination does not amount to locations or areas which, on the basis of 
evidence gathered through non-technical and/or technical survey and the analysis of any 
                                               
 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Convention on Cluster Munitions: http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf  
16
 4
th
 meeting of States parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Statement of Mozambique on clearance 
and risk reduction, delivered by Alberto Augusto, IND Director, 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2013/09/MOZ-Statement-on-Clearance-and-Risk-Reduction-Lusaka-ingles-
11.09.2013.pdf  
17
 IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations, 2003, 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imas-international-standards/english/series-
04/IMAS-04-10-Ed2-Am6.pdf  
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existing data relevant to the associated site/area, are known by national authorities to be either 
SHAs or CHAs. 
 
Mozambique has included sites that are inaccessible for conventional demining as ‘residual 
minefields’ in IMSMA (i.e. 116,105 square metres in Inhambane district and 750 square metres 
in Tete).18 Following the logic above, these areas do not amount to residual contamination, as 
they are already known. Further analysis through non-technical surveys needs to be conducted, 
to determine if these areas are ‘mined areas’, as defined by the APMBC, or if they can be 
cancelled, based on evidence.  
  
                                               
 
18
 Information shared by IND, June 2014, available in Annex II.  
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History of Developing National Capacities  
National Mine Action Plan  
Mozambique’s National Mine Action Plan 2008 – 2014 includes a target on national capacities 
and residual contamination:  
TARGET 5. By 2010 establish sustainable mechanisms for national capacity to 
handle residual mine and UXO issues  
Objective 5.1 Identify the entity that will be responsible for residual demining 
issues; 
Objective 5.2 Take action on the management and implementation of residual 
tasks including coordinating MRE and facilitating assistance to 
mines and UXO victims. 
Objective 5.3 Analyse IND’s role and its relations with other government and 
program partners, as international humanitarian demining operators 
conclude their work. 
 
The target is accompanied by six “main tasks:” 
 identify the entity that will deal with residual mine and UXO issues; 
 build the capacity of the entity that will deal with residual mine and UXO issues; 
 implement a system for coordinating MRE in districts affected by mines and UXO; 
 establish a system for collecting information on mine victims in order to facilitate 
assistance to them; 
 draw up an action plan for the management and implementation of residual demining 
tasks and identify requirements in order to ensure continued assistance to mine victims 
and MRE; and 
 include the requirements of landmine and UXO issues, MRE and AVSM in the budget of 
provincial governments. 
The substantial references to the management of residual contamination in Mozambique’s 
National Mine Action Plan is a clear indication that the topic has been on the radar for several 
years.  
Workshop on defining the end-state 
IND organised a workshop on ‘Defining the end-state: what is expected of Mozambique in order 
to declare compliance with Article 5.1 of the Landmine Convention’ in Maputo in November 
2012. The workshop brought several stakeholders together, including ISU, IND, operators and 
donors. The workshop’s last session focused Mozambique’s national capacity to address 
residual contamination. The workshop report notes that IND recognises that a residual threat 
from UXO and other ERW will remain after demining is concluded, highlighting the lack of mine 
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maps, indicating exactly where the landmines were placed; and that there are still many 
uninhabited and unexplored areas, where it is possible that mined areas may be discovered 
after Mozambique’s declaration of compliance with A5.19  
The ISU recommended the IND to look into issues related to:20  
 educating the population about ERW hazards and who will the communities contact 
when they find a UXO;  
 developing legislation, policies and procedures to address the residual ERW threat;  
 training local authorities on how to respond to UXO hazards;  
 establishing regulations regarding the use of land for hazardous activities;  
 regulating hazardous activities and how;  
 the chain of communication when a suspicious item is found;  
 investigating and securing the item and the site;   
 removing or destroying the items;   
 establishing and enforcing the standards on responses; and 
 information management.  
Training initiatives  
The FADM 
US Africa Command (AFRICOM)21 has conducted a series of training initiatives targeting the 
FADM since 2011.  
Thirty-eight Mozambican soldiers successfully completed a three-week demining training course 
in Maputo taught by five US Navy EOD technicians in June 2011. The course, a partnership 
between AFRICOM and FADM, was the first initiative to train FADM in demining and EOD.22  
An AFRICOM representative has, however, pointed out that AFRICOM is reluctant to implement 
further training activities with FADM, due to concerns related to lack of accountability and 
commitment on behalf of FADM. Equipment provided to the FADM, including five vehicles, 
reportedly “disappeared”, implying concerns related to accountability and trust.  
 
The Police  
The IND contracted South African commercial company MECHEM in 2010, to conduct four EOD 
level 1 and 2 courses to IND staff and members of the police force. MECHEM organised four 
courses in Quelimane (Zambezia Province), Nampula (Nampula), Pemba (Cabo Delgado) and 
Lichinga (Niassa).  
MECHEM trained a total of 51 individuals (IND staff and police members), of which 46 
successfully passed the theoretical and practical tests. Out of these, a total of 32 police officers 
successfully completed the courses. The four-week courses started with seven days of EOD 
                                               
 
19
 IND workshop report, shared by IND, September 2014.  
20
 Ibid.  
21
 http://www.africom.mil/  
22
 http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/8441/soldiers-take-first-step-in-combating-mozambiques-  
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theory, followed by practical EOD training. The participants then spent the remaining time on 
addressing previously recorded hazards and conducting EOD activities, including demolitions. 23 
MECHEM assessed course participants through a written examination, a practical assessment, 
continuous evaluation and individual course reports for each participant.  
MECHEM highlighted a number of challenges during the EOD training, including related to the 
following areas: 
 insufficient storage facilities to safeguard explosives; 
 lack of police transport for deployment; 
 inadequate financial police resources to purchase necessary equipment, including 
sandbags and insulating tape; 
 no sleeping facilities for the police during deployments; and 
 problems with detonators used.  
MECHEM noted that students were “eager to learn”, and that everyone passed the theoretical 
and practical tests.  
Looking forward, MECHEM highlights a few issues in its consolidated training report: 
 police members should work together as a team to support each other; 
 if possible, trained IND members should be available to support police members when 
dealing with ERW; and 
 all trained police members should receive basic demining/BAC training.  
 
IND has shared a number of lessons learnt regarding the EOD training in the Northern 
provinces:24 
 the police assumed responsibility and continued to use equipment donated to identify 
and destroy UXO discovered by the civilian population; 
 the police provided report to the IND on activities completed on an irregular basis; 
 additional refresher training, training on reporting in accordance with IMSMA and 
replacement of consumable equipment is needed; 
 the police needs a clear structure for the trained staff. The IND recommends the 
formation of provincial Bomb Squads or integration of the trained police into the Rapid 
Reaction Force; and  
 standard operating procedures (SOPs) are needed to outline the responsibilities of 
various actors at the national, provincial and district levels.  
More recently, the IND contracted AFRICOM to conduct Training of Trainer (ToT) with the IND 
Mobile Training Teams in 2012 – 2014.  
AFRICOM will continue to support the IND with the development and equipment of three Mobile 
Training Teams until October 2015, with a view that the teams will be used to train the police to 
address residual contamination, once proactive mine clearance operations are completed in 
December 2014. 
                                               
 
23
 MECHEM Consolidated report: EOD training on behalf of IND, Mozambique 5 October  2010 - 23 March 2011  
24
 Presentation by Alberto Maverengue Augusto, Director of IND, during 13 MSP, Geneva, December 2013  
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The objective of AFRICOM’s involvement is to ‘build capacity with local police and government 
agencies in EOD/ERW operations, disposal of obsolete ammunitions stockpiles, saving life 
under hazardous conditions, quality assurance (QA) and Land Release procedures.  These 
Train-the-Trainer missions are designed to put IND as the lead agency in build countrywide 
capacity with local government in the disposal of explosive remnants of war (ERW) upon the 
conclusion of demining operations in December 2014.’ 25 
The proposed dates for AFRICOM’s training are: 
 November 2014 - Gaza 
 May 2015 - Maputo 
 September 2015 - Inhambane 
AFRICOM proposes that each mobile team should be equipped with a specific “package”, 
facilitating EOD operations.26 
IND informed that the plan is to have 10 EOD-trained police officers in each Province by the end 
of 2015. IND has further suggested that EOD training should be included in the general training 
at the police academy.  
  
                                               
 
25
 AFRICOM, draft concept of operations to support Mozambique HMA FY15, shared by AFRICOM, July 2014  
26
 List of equipment package available in Annex III.  
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Addressing Residual Contamination  
Northern Provinces  
As of June 2014, IND has declared a total of six provinces to be ‘mine-free’: 
1. Cabo Delgado (2012) 
2. Niassa (2012) 
3. Nampula (2011) 
4. Zambezia (2010) 
5. Gaza (2012) 
6. Maputo (2014) 
Proactive large scale humanitarian demining effectively came to an end in four northern 
provinces when HALO completed the “Mine Impact Free District” (MIFD) survey and closed its 
programme in the North in 2007. The MIFD survey resulted in the Mozambican Government 
formalizing and adopting the “Mine Free District” (MFD) Process, completed by 2012.  
Between 1994 and 2007, HALO reported the destruction of 100,840 mines and 22,329 items of 
UXO in the Northern provinces. In comparison, during the finalisation of the MFD process 
between 2008 and 2012, 31 mines and 321 UXO were found and destroyed. 
The GICHD travelled to three northern provinces (Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa) together 
with two IND staff members, to better understand the extent and nature of the residual 
contamination problem, and the level of national capacities that currently address it.   
Below is a brief summary of key findings from meetings in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Meetings 
in Nampula were unfortunately cancelled due to the arrival of the First Lady in the province. It 
should be noted that as far as the IND is aware, the Nampula PDC has not yet been established. 
In addition, there have been no reported EOD call-outs, which may account for the limited 
interest at the level of the Provincial Government in Niassa. Cluster bomb stockpiles, stored at 
the Nacala military ammunition store in Nampala, are currently being dealt with by NPA (with 
support from Fenix Insight Ltd), who are assisting with their safe management and disposal. 
Cabo Delgado: key findings 
 the public reports any suspected explosive objects to community leaders, who are 
instructed to inform the police/district government;  
 commercial ‘verification’ takes place in conjunction with infrastructure/mining activities;  
 the PDC is functional (regular meetings);  
 the police conducts EOD call outs, often jointly with military engineers;  
 transportation is a key challenge;  
 the level of contamination is low. One item has been reported so far in 2014, a total of 
three EOD call outs took place in 2013; and 
 police members who completed the 2010 EOD training are posted across the province, 
which means they do not work as a unified team; this is the principal reason they 
respond to call outs with the military engineers to form up a team, a collaboration that 
appears to be working well.  
Niassa: key findings 
 no additional mines have been discovered since IND declared it a “mine-free” province; 
there is a limited UXO problem (police/FADM destroyed a total of 30 UXO in 2013); 
 occasional hazardous items are reported to, and managed by, the police; 
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 the PDC exists on paper but does not seem to be active in practice. The role and 
responsibilities of the PDC are not clear; 
 since 2011 there have been issues with funding equipment and transport. The police 
have been effectively inactive since 2013, as there are no more detonators and limited 
explosives. They have been marking reported items but have not carried out any 
demolitions; as of June 2014, there were 11 outstanding spot tasks; 
 the police expects the IND to provide equipment, whereas this should be the 
responsibility of the provincial government; 
 the police have records of EOD work, and keep a list of outstanding call outs (11); 
 all EOD work has been reported to the IND; and 
 roles and responsibilities of the PDC and the police need to be clarified. 
Nature and extent of residual contamination 
A review of clearance results and the contamination situation in the Northern provinces provides 
a good overview of the extent and nature of the residual contamination problem post- 
Of the total 31 mines found, 14 were destroyed during EOD call outs while 17 were found during 
clearance operations.  Out of the 42 areas cleared after 2007, 17 mines were found in seven 
areas; no mines were found in 35 of the cleared areas (UXO items were found in seven of the 35 
areas).  In the areas where mines were found, four areas had one mine only. The fact that 35 
areas were cleared, without discovering any mines, and that a further 15 areas were entirely 
cancelled suggest that there is a need for more efficient and effective survey, to avoid 
unnecessary clearance. This information also highlights the importance of implementing 
effective handover and reporting procedures, including inclusive information sharing, to ensure 
that the level of confidence in the released land is as high as possible, and that the 
survey/clearance/cancellation activities are accurately recorded at all relevant levels.  
In summary, clearance information from the four Northern provinces illustrates that around 
100,000 mines were reported as destroyed as a result of large-scale, proactive demining 
between 1994 and 2007.  In the finalisation of the IND-adopted MFD process by 2012, only 17 
mines were reported as destroyed from seven areas.  As reported during the assessment visits 
to the north, items of UXO have been identified since 2013, but they are isolated and low in 
number.   
National capacities needed to manage and address residual contamination  
Mozambique’s national capacities should be developed and structured to respond to the 
anticipated residual contamination problems in the most effective and efficient manner. It is 
imperative that national capacities correspond to the actual needs on the ground, that they are 
appropriate to the Mozambican context and sustainable; appreciating the available human and 
financial resources.   
 
 
 
 18 | 35 
 
Responsible actors: EOD and mine clearance 
The FADM 
As mentioned above, AFRICOM started training the FADM in 2011, through an eight-week 
demining and EOD training. AFRICOM has also donated equipment to the FADM, including 
vehicles, metal detectors and PPEs.  
The FADM has been involved in clearance activities, responsible for specific tasks, including 
around an Army ammunition deposit in Inhambane province, in collaboration with HI.27 Based on 
several meetings with stakeholders in Mozambique, the assessment team can conclude that 
there is a general scepticism regarding FADM’s capabilities to conduct effective and efficient 
demining and to manage resources in an accountable and transparent manner.   
It is clear that AFRICOM’s collaboration with FADM was fraught with challenges. A senior 
AFRICOM staff member, heavily involved in the training, noted several challenges related to the 
FADM, while underlying his reluctance to work with them again. Lack of motivation was 
highlighted as the principal challenge within FADM. In summary, key challenges include issues 
related to: 
 accountability;  
 transparency; and  
 information-sharing.  
The Police 
As outlined above, MECHEM’s training of police officers in the northern provinces has resulted 
in some EOD capacity within the police force.  
Stakeholders agreed that it is appropriate to develop an EOD capacity within the police, stating 
several reasons, including:   
 EOD training is already underway, a high degree of commitment has been noted;  
 the police have a great geographical coverage and visibility, as they are present in most 
areas of Mozambique; and  
 the police are, for many communities, the “natural” entity to report safety-related issues 
to, including suspicious hazardous objects.  
Given the widespread presence of the police, they could play an important role in the reporting 
chain, serving as the first point of contact for communities, when suspicious hazardous object 
are reported. Their key responsibility would be to secure the area, ensure the safety of the local 
population, to conduct EOD (if they have the technical expertise and necessary resources) and 
to report to the coordinating body. 
Key challenges related to the police’s ability to effectively take on the responsibility to address 
residual contamination include:  
 lack of resources and limited capacity; 
 concerns related to the effectiveness of its chain of command;   
                                               
 
27
 The task was reportedly divided into two parts. HI cleared one area and the Army cleared the second half. HI 
reportedly conducted QA of the area cleared by the Army. (Interview with HI Mine Action Coordinator, Maputo 
June 2014) 
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 some informants have reservations concerning the police taking on more responsibilities, 
such as addressing residual contamination, and question what their incentive would be, if 
not accompanied by increased pay; and   
 there is a general concern that placing the police in charge of EOD/demining risks 
resulting in inefficient and ineffective activities, with poor results.  
Post-completion regulatory institution    
The IND has since its creation in 1999 fallen under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), a 
decision viewed as appropriate and strategic, as it resulted in significant international exposure 
for the mine action programme; instrumental in securing international funding and support.  
Presidential Decree No. 18/95 of May 1999 that established the IND mandates the institution to 
carry out certain tasks, responding to the specific context and needs of a country severely 
affected by landmines. The mandate includes to: draft policies and strategies, define demining 
priorities, produce action plans and lead, coordinate and control mine clearance activities in 
Mozambique. Key responsibilities also include monitoring, quality control and information 
management.28   
The transition from a pro-active phase of humanitarian demining to a reactive phase should 
ideally be accompanied by a restructuring and shift of the IND from the MoFA to a more 
appropriate institutional home, given the expected problems and challenges at hand. 
Acknowledging the above-mentioned transition, it is important to examine the needs that a 
residual contamination context will bring about. As highlighted above, the residual contamination 
problem in provinces declared “mine-free” can provide a useful indication of what can be 
expected in remaining provinces, where proactive mine clearance is still ongoing. A brief 
analysis of available residual contamination information from Niassa and Cabo Delgado 
provinces illustrates that the residual contamination has been predominantly UXO, with only one 
landmine reported so far.  
 
Given the nature and extent of the residual contamination problem (based on the situation in the 
Northern provinces), a future regulatory institution may have the following key responsibilities:  
 information and knowledge management;  
 EOD training; and  
 accreditation / quality assurance (including of commercial companies).  
 
Future home of a regulatory institution: key options  
The MoFA commissioned an internal study in 2013, looking into the transition of a number of 
institutes (including IND), that currently fall under the MoFA. The study concludes that, once 
Mozambique is declared mine free, IND should be transferred from the MoFA to the ministry of 
Defence (MoD). It further recommends that a specific mine action unit should be established 
within the MoD.  
                                               
 
28
 APMBC A5 extension request, 2008, ibid.  
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The assessment team met with senior representatives from key ministries, considered to be 
potential options for IND’s future institutional home.29 Below is a brief summary of opportunities 
and challenges related to ministerial options for a future institutional home.  
The MoD 
Opportunities 
A limited number of informants pointed out that a future institutional home within the MoD may 
facilitate coordination with mine action programmes in neighbouring countries, in particular 
Zimbabwe.30  
Challenges 
Most respondents expressed concern at the prospect of a future institute being housed at the 
MoD.  
Transparency and accountability  
Given the sensitive nature of the MoD’s role and responsibilities, there is a concern that this 
could result in limited transparency and accountability which could negatively impact on future 
clearance activities and information-sharing. Most informants explicitly pointed out that they fear 
that a future institutional home within the MoD could jeopardise transparent activities and sound 
information management, including information-sharing. Concerns related to the management of 
residual contamination being politicised should it fall under the MoD were also expressed by 
several informants.   
 
The fact that the MoD is a centralised ministry could represent an additional challenge in the 
future management of residual contamination, given the importance of sound coordination and 
collaboration with provincial governments and local communities.  
The Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
Opportunities 
The fact that the police falls under the MoI may mean that the MoI would be in a good position to 
coordinate with the police and to encourage it to implement future EOD activities in the most 
effective and efficient manner. Some informants underlined the MoI’s level of authority and the 
positive influence this could have in a residual contamination context, in which the police would 
most likely play an increasingly important role. It appears that the MoI is generally viewed as 
more transparent than the MoD.  
Challenges 
Some informants highlighted concerns related to MOI’s credibility and transparency. For 
example, one reference was made to Mozambique’s riot police (Forca de intervencao rapida 
(FIR)), which has been criticised for excessive use of violence during the recent local elections.  
 
 
 
                                               
 
29
 Not in order of preference.  
30
 MoD noted that the Zimbabwe Mine Action centre (ZMAC) preferred to liaise with the MoD rather than the IND, given the 
military profile of the ZMAC.  
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The Ministry of Administration and Territorial Affairs (MAE) 
The MAE is responsible for the administration of the laws overseeing local government.31 Local 
government is enshrined in the constitution as amended by Law No. 9/96: The tasks of local 
authorities are to:  
 organise the participation of citizens in finding a solution to the community problems; 
 promote local development; and  
 strengthen and consolidate democracy within the framework of Mozambican state unity.   
Opportunities 
Previous experience 
The National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) transferred from the MoFA to the MAE in 
2005. This shift is generally seen as a success by external partners and the Government of 
Mozambique.  The principal rationale behind the move was the changing environment; under the 
MoFA, the INGC’s principal responsibility was to receive and disperse international funding to 
relevant implementing actors. In contrast, under the MAE, the INCG is directly responsible for 
managing disasters. The INGC’s transfer from the MoFA to the MAE was accompanied by a 
shift in funding from disaster management activities being predominantly internationally funded 
to relying primarily on national funding. The INGC underlined that the ease with which its 
institutional home shifted from the MoFA to the MAE was partly due to a general change in the 
disaster management approach in Mozambique. The new approach, in combination with the 
shift in funding sources resulted in an agreement that the MoFA would no longer be an 
appropriate institutional home.  
 
Community connections 
In contrast to the MoD, the MAE is decentralised and, thanks to its mandate, regarded as the 
Ministry with the closest connections with local communities, something that would be valuable 
in the future management of residual contamination.  
 
Approachable 
The MAE is further regarded as an “open” and approachable ministry, a precondition for the 
effective facilitation of future coordination and information-sharing with the relevant actors, 
including at the provincial and district levels.   
 
Challenges 
Some stakeholders expressed concern that the MAE may not have enough “authority” to house 
a future institution in the most effective manner, keeping in mind that coordination with the police 
and the FADM will be essential. Regardless of this potential limitation, however, informants still 
regard the MAE as the most appropriate home for a future institution.  
 
  
                                               
 
31
 http://www.clgf.org.uk/userfiles/1/files/Mozambique%20local%20government%20profile%202011-12.pdf  
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Findings and Recommendations  
What is residual contamination? 
Acknowledging the APMBC’s definition of a ‘mined area’ and IMAS’ definition of ‘residual risk’, it 
is logical to define residual contamination as the sites or areas where mines and other ERW are 
discovered after all confirmed or suspected hazardous areas have been processed and 
considered fit for normal human use (at least with respect to the surface and immediate 
subsurface of these areas).  
Residual contamination does not amount to locations or areas which, on the basis of evidence 
gathered through non-technical and/or technical survey and the analysis of any existing data 
relevant to the associated site/area, are known by national authorities to be either confirmed or 
suspected hazardous areas. 
Recommendations:  
 Develop a plan, detailing how areas that are currently categorised as ‘residual minefields’ 
will be analysed. 
 
 Re-examine the information that led to areas being entered into the IMSMA database as 
‘residual minefields.’ Carry out a desk assessment and revisit these areas to conduct 
non-technical surveys to determine if there is any existing basis of evidence for them to 
be considered suspected hazardous areas and if any can be cancelled. Regarding 
recording areas as SHAs, it is important to underline that the IMAS notes, “inaccessible 
areas, or areas with limited information available, should not by default be recorded as 
SHA. SHAs should only be recorded in a database when there is sufficient evidence to 
justify doing so.”32 
 
 Re-classify remaining areas that are currently categorised as ‘residual minefields’ in 
IMSMA, reflecting the findings of the above survey activities and analysis and develop a 
technical survey and clearance plan to address the remaining suspected and/or 
confirmed hazardous areas accordingly.  
 
 Ensure IMSMA does not contain any areas categorised as ‘residual minefields’ while 
proactive demining is still ongoing and until areas that are truly residual (previously 
unknown) are discovered after all SHAs and CHAs have been processed and considered 
fit for normal human use.  
 
Extent and nature of the residual contamination problem  
A clear understanding of the problem at hand is a precondition for predicting what the future 
challenges are likely to be, and what national capacities will be needed to address them.  
 
Assuming that the situation in the ‘mine-free’ Northern Provinces is indicative of what can be 
expected in the rest of the country, one can predict that the residual contamination problem will 
be limited, mainly consisting of UXO.  
                                               
 
32
 IMAS 07.11, Land Release,  March 2013, http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imas-
international-standards/english/series-07/IMAS-07.11-Ed.1-Am2.pdf  
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Recommendations:  
 Develop sustainable national capacities that are appropriate to the Mozambican context. 
 
 Develop and sustain national EOD capacity within the police. Given the identified 
strengths and opportunities, the police is the most suitable actor to be responsible for 
addressing residual UXO/ERW contamination (spot tasks).  
 
 
 Allocate residual demining tasks to the FADM (area tasks).  
Post-completion context and needs for a regulatory institute   
The IND was established in 1999, mandated to carry out specific tasks, reflecting the problems 
at the time. The transition from decades of proactive survey and mine clearance (by international 
operators) to predominantly reactive responses to reported threats (to be dealt with by national 
actors) will result in a new context with different problems and distinct needs. 
 
 
Recommendations:  
 
 Analyse future anticipated problem and develop capacities accordingly.  
 
 Develop a future regulatory structure and capacities based on actual needs;  
ensure it is appropriate and sustainable.  
 
 Secure a future regulatory institutional home within the MAE.   
 
 Modify/renew the mandate as appropriate (name change).  
National stakeholders, national ownership and sustainability 
The transition from a proactive mine action programme to a post-completion context is expected 
to be accompanied by a shift to greater national ownership, including regarding managing the 
problem and funding the activities. National commitment will be essential to ensure necessary 
resources are made available.   
Recommendation:  
 Secure commitment to addressing residual contamination at the highest level of relevant 
actors (MAE, MoI, MoD), through effective and regular coordination and information 
sharing.  
 
 Secure financial commitment for the costs associated with managing residual 
contamination. 
 
Roles and responsibilities 
Mozambique’s transition to a residual contamination context will require a careful examination of 
the various stakeholders involved, and an agreement on their respective roles and 
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responsibilities. Transparency and clarity will be essential to ensure effective and efficient 
management of residual contamination, including coordination and information management.  
The involvement of the PDCs is likely to be greater in the future, given the expected increased 
involvement of provincial government structures. It appears, however, that the PDCs’ capacities 
and resources are at times limited and that their roles and responsibilities would benefit from 
being clarified.  
Recommendations: 
 Develop a national policy and/or SOPs on the management of residual contamination, 
defining key actors’ roles and responsibilities, including stipulating resource allocation 
and division of labour.  
 
 Ensure reporting structures are transparent and known to everyone.  
 
 
 Review and clarify the mandate, roles and responsibilities of the PDCs.  
 
Information management: a precondition for effective coordination  
Information management, including the management of the national IMSMA data base, is one of 
IND’s key responsibilities. It will be crucial to ensure that relevant information is accurate, 
accessible, available and up-to-date in a residual contamination context.  
Recommendation:  
 Ensure effective information management. Information related to future accidents and 
activities should be collected, stored, analysed, updated and shared, to facilitate the 
effective and efficient management of residual contamination.   
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Annexes  
Annex I: Assessment TOR 
TERMS OF REFERENCE  
CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AND MAPPING OF  
NATIONAL CAPACITY TO MANAGE RESIDUAL UXO AND OTHER ERW 
 
1. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
After more than 20 years of demining operations, Mozambique is nearing completion of active 
demining operations in accordance with its obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention. The Government of Mozambique’s National Demining Institute (IND) has 
presented a plan to conclude demining of all known mined areas by 31 December 2014. This 
achievement mark a significant milestone for a country once-considered to be one of the most 
heavily affected in the world. However, like any country that has suffered through modern 
warfare, Mozambique will face a continuing threat from residual UXO and other Explosive 
Remnants of War for years to come. In order to address the residual threat from UXO in 
provinces where all known mined areas are already cleared, the UNDP and IND have conducted 
some training and equipping of the police in Explosive Ordinance Disposal. As well, Provincial 
Mine Action Commissions have been established in 9 of the 10 provinces to help coordinate 
demining operations at a provincial and local level. Provincial Demining Commissions are also 
intended to play a role in coordinated and reporting on any UXO or ERW incidents after 
deminers have concluded operations in the province. 
 
Over the years, the Government of Mozambique and International Partners have made 
significant investments to build a national Mine Action Coordination Centre, namely the IND, that 
has the responsibility to coordinate all activities related to Mine Action in Mozambique. Once the 
objective of clearing all of the known mined areas in Mozambique has been completed, the 
future of IND is unclear.  
 
As part of the UNDP’s project to ‘Support the National Demining Programme’, the UNDP and the 
Government of Mozambique are interested in conducting a forward looking capacity assessment 
and mapping to assess how the existing capacity of the IND and other government institutions 
can be adapted to provide a sustainable national capacity capable of addressing the long-term 
residual threat of UXO and other ERW after the completion of large-scale active demining 
operations. In this manner, the UNDP and partners intend to ensure that the capacity and 
investment in the IND is not lost following the completion of demining and that a sustainable 
national capacity is in place to ensure an appropriate response to the threat to civilians’ safety 
and security posed by residual UXO and ERW. 
 
2. OVERALL OBJECTIVE 
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To conduct a capacity assessment and mapping of the IND and other relevant government 
institutions that will provide recommendations to the Government of Mozambique for the 
transition of IND and the establishment of a sustainable national capacity  to the manage and 
respond to residual UXO and ERW issues in Mozambique. 
 
3. SCOPE 
To accomplish the above objective the capacity assessment and mapping exercise should 
include the following topics:  
 The mandate and legislative framework of IND and mine action operations in 
Mozambique  
 National Legislation and regulatory framework for the production, transfer, stockpile and 
use of explosives in Mozambique 
 Structure and mapping of relevant capacities for management of residual UXO and ERW 
in the IND, including but not limited to:  
o licensing and contracting of operators;  
o establishment and maintenance of national standards;  
o Quality Assurance and Quality Control of mine action activities; 
o Information Management 
 Review and Capacity Assessment of the  Provincial Demining Commissions  
 Review of mandates and capacities of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Planning and Development and Ministry of Administration and State Affairs 
(MAE) 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The capacity assessment will require research to be conducted in Maputo Mozambique and 
possible visits to Provincial capitals. The following methodology should be used to achieve the 
objectives of the survey: 
 Desktop research 
 Key informant interviews with inter alia: 
o National Demining Institute including Director and heads of departments 
o Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
o Ministry of Interior 
o Ministry of Defence 
o Ministry of Planning and Development 
o Ministry of Administration and Territorial Affairs (MAE) 
o National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) 
o Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (FADM) Engineering Unit 
o Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) 
o Provincial Demining Commissions 
o Humanitarian Demining Operators (Apopo, Halo Trust, Handicap International) 
 
5. EXPECTED RESULTS AND DELIVERABLES 
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Research conducted for the capacity assessment and mapping exercise should result in the 
following key deliverables: 
1) A final report to include a listing of all relevant actors, their capacities and possible future 
roles in the management of explosives and residual threats from UXO and ERW. The 
final report should also include key recommendations to provide guidance on the 
following questions:  
a. How can the government of Mozambique best utilize the capacity of IND in the 
future to address residual threats of UXO and management of explosives in 
Mozambique?  
b. What should be done with the current IND database of clearance records to 
ensure it is available for future use?  
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Annex II: Individuals interviewed   
Name Title Organisation 
Alberto Augusto  Director IND 
Antonio Belchior Vaz Martins Head, Operations 
Department  
IND 
Thomas Cuve Chief of Human R esources  IND 
Robert Afreda  Information Management 
Advisor  
NPA 
Mario Inacio Omia Provincial Permanent 
Secretary 
Maputo Provincial Demining 
Commission 
Joao Tiago Meneses 
Machado Ribeiro 
Director General  National Institute for Disaster 
Management (INGC) 
Oliver Hyde-Smith Programme Manager  HALO Trust 
Coronel Dias Esquinar 
Jaqueta  
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Annex II: IND contamination maps 
 
 
As of June 2014, the number of remaining tasks by Province is illustrated in table below: 
Province Remaining Tasks Area Suspended (sqm) Area On Going (sqm) Residual Area (sqm) Open Area (sqm) 
Inhambane 43 0 0 116,105 104,120 
Manica 108 11,878 403,382 0 586,289 
Sofala 317 190,865 20,793 0 2,893,104 
Tete 10 0 20,437 750 1,328,445 
Grand Total 478 202,743 444,612 116,855 4,911,958 
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Annex III: AFRICOM equipment package for mobile teams 
Proposed Equipment Package per Mobile Team 
 Minelab Detectors x 4 
 Vallons w/Large Loops x 2 
 Shonstat metal detector x 1 
 Demo Box x 1 
 PPE x 4 sets 
 Demining Tool Sets x 4 
 Hook and Line Kit x 1 
 Range Finder x 1 
 Binos x 1 
 GPS x 1 
 Video Package x 1 
 Lesson Guides 
 Student Guides 
 
 
